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1. Introduction 
Informational frictions impede the provision of external finance, particularly for companies with opaque, 
intangible assets. We study how partners at venture capital (VC) firms overcome such frictions by 
investing in startup founders with whom they share a common ethnicity. Analyzing a large dataset 
covering a broad cross-section of the U.S. VC industry, we find that a shared ethnicity is associated with a 
higher probability that the VC firm invests in the startup, stronger VC firm involvement conditional on 
such an investment taking place, and more entrepreneur-friendly financial contracts. These results are 
economically significant and are robust to a variety of controls, including VC firm and startup fixed 
effects. However, we also show that a shared ethnicity is associated with a lower probability of successful 
exit. Our findings suggest that a shared ethnicity mitigates search, selection and monitoring costs, but VC 
firms appear to overestimate such benefits and either match with startups of inferior quality or do not 
impose a sufficient level of control on their portfolio companies. 
 By presenting detailed evidence on the importance of shared ethnicity in the U.S. VC market, we 
make two key contributions. Our first contribution is to validate the role of ethnic minorities in 
entrepreneurship by documenting the role ethnicity plays in the provision of venture finance. Research by 
Saxenian and coauthors suggests that entrepreneurs who are immigrants and/or belong to an ethnic 
minority form a large subgroup of all innovation-based startup founders in the United States (Saxenian 
1999, 2006; Wadhwa et al. 2007). For startups launched between 1995 and 2005, there was at least one 
immigrant key founder in 25% of technology and engineering companies across the U.S., and in 52% of 
all companies based in Silicon Valley. A sizeable fraction of VC firms also employ professionals who 
come from an ethnic minority: Our data reveal that 14% of all VC firms have at least one partner who is 
either Chinese or Indian. Individuals with a shared ethnicity often form networks where they interact and 
exchange ideas with each other. As reported by Saxenian (2006), there are at least 30 professional and 
networking associations targeting immigrants in Silicon Valley (e.g., The Indus Entrepreneur, TiE) 
composing over 33,000 members.  
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Collectively, these statistics suggest that ethnicity could be important for how the U.S. VC market 
operates. We formally test this expectation, and show that a shared ethnicity (between partners and 
founders) matters for whether, when and how VC firms invest in startups. Our evidence adds broadly to 
the growing literature that shows that social proximity, in addition to geographical proximity, can matter 
for finance (Cohen et al., 2008). We also add to the literature that shows the importance of ethnicity for 
trust (Glaeser, 2000; Fisman, 2003), innovation (Agrawal et al., 2007; Kerr, 2008) and founding team 
composition (Ruef et al., 2003). 
 Our second contribution is to shed new light on how VC firms overcome the severe informational 
frictions they encounter when financing startups. Existing research has uncovered several methods that 
VCs use to improve their information collection before and after the investment is made: They specialize 
in industries, geographies and investment stages (Stuart & Sorenson, 2001; Chen et al., 2010) write 
sophisticated financial contracts (Kaplan & Stromberg, 2003, 2004; Bengtsson & Sensoy, 2011), 
experiment with new investment types (Sorensen, 2008), are actively involved in their portfolio 
companies (Lerner, 1995; Hellmann & Puri, 2002), and syndicate deals with other trusted VCs (Lerner, 
1994; Hochberg et al., 2007, 2010). Common to these solutions is that they derive from VC firm’s 
capabilities, rather than from the quality of the personal match between the VC firm’s partners and the 
startup’s founders.  
The quality of the personal match is arguably important in the VC market. In contrast to the 
typical financings utilized by mature companies (i.e., public equity, bonds, and bank loans), people shape 
the demand and supply of venture capital financing to a significant degree. On the demand side, the 
individual founder’s human capital is a key asset in a young, entrepreneurial company. On the supply side, 
the VC firm consists of individual partners who screen, monitor and provide operational support to 
portfolio companies. Thus, the success of a startup hinges critically on the capabilities of its founders and 
partners (Hsu, 2007; Sorensen, 2007). Moreover, the relational nature of the VC market means that these 
two groups have frequent personal interactions with each other. Founders meet with partners during 
pitching, due diligence, contract negotiations, and board meetings. A high-quality match can arguably 
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improve the startup’s success chances, whereas a low-quality match can create tensions that impede 
value-creation. 
In this paper, we focus our attention on one dimension of person-based matching—ethnicity—
because it can be measured reliably and comprehensively, and, as we discussed above, matters in practice. 
Our findings that VC firms use ethnicity as a criterion for how they select, monitor and contract with 
entrepreneurs confirm anecdotal evidence that social networks and trusted referrals are important in 
explaining the matching process on the VC market (Fried & Hisrich, 1994). From a broader perspective, 
the findings add to the literature on the impact of culture in economic exchange (Becker, 1996; Guiso et 
al. 2006; Iyer & Schoar, 2010), which defines culture as a set of shared values, beliefs, and norms of a 
group or community (a definition that fits well with ethnic minorities).  
We analyze a dataset from the U.S. VC market, which is collected from VentureEconomics. The 
final sample includes 9,079 unique VC firm-startup pairs. Importantly, the dataset covers both pairs for 
which the VC firm took a board seat and pairs for which it did not. We can thereby separately study 
whether the VC firm invested and whether it took a board seat, conditional on an investment. Our data are 
limited to investments for which VentureEconomics report the name of at least one VC firm partner and 
at least one startup founder. This restriction follows from our strategy of using names to infer the ethnicity 
of each individual. We focus on eight ethnicities: Jewish, Indian (i.e., from India), Chinese, Korean, 
Hispanic, Russian, Japanese and Vietnamese. These ethnicities are chosen because they can be identified 
using our data on names, and they represent important minority ethnicities in the U.S. Hence, we 
deliberately do not analyze ethnic groups that frequently share names with other ethnicities. For example, 
Danish and Norwegian names are often similar. We also do not analyze “broad” ethnic groups, such as 
Anglo-Saxon/British, because they consist primarily of individuals with little or no connection to each 
other due to shared ethnicity. 
Our empirical methodology is straightforward, yet it permits us to assess the importance of shared 
ethnicity. We run a series of regressions with ”Same Ethnicity” as the focal independent variable (which 
is a dummy that takes the value 1 if partner and founder have the same ethnicity, and is 0 otherwise). All 
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specifications include fixed effects for company industry, location, and year of investment. We also run 
separate robustness regressions with company fixed effects and VC firm fixed effects, respectively. 
Because the coefficient on ”Same Ethnicity” remains qualitatively similar across specifications with 
different included fixed effects, we infer that our results are likely not driven by omitted variables. 
Including company and VC firm fixed effects also broadens the interpretation of our findings. Our 
regressions with company fixed effects compares the investment behaviors of the focal VC firm versus 
other VC firms investing in the focal company; our regressions with VC firm fixed effects compares the 
focal VC firm’s investment behavior in the focal company versus in other companies.  
We document five results on matching based on ethnicity. First, a shared ethnicity is associated 
with a higher probability that the VC firm invests in the startup. We derive this result by comparing the 
instance of shared ethnicity between actual investments and counterfactual ones. Second, conditional on 
investment, we find that a shared ethnicity is associated with a higher probability that the VC firm takes a 
board seat. Third, a shared ethnicity is associated with the VC firm being more likely to invest at an early 
stage of the startup. Fourth, a shared ethnicity is associated with the VC firm investing more capital and 
across more rounds in the startup. Finally, we find that a shared ethnicity is associated with the VC firm 
offering higher pre-money valuation and receive fewer investor-friendly cash flow contingency rights in 
the financial contract.  
These findings unambiguously show that a shared ethnicity predicts the existence and intensity of 
the match between the VC firm and the startup. Our next step is to investigate how such matching relates 
to investment outcomes. Either relationship is possible, because there are competing rationales for why 
personal-based matching happens in the VC market. 
On the one hand, a VC firm could derive several benefits from making co-ethnic investments. 
Consider a U.S. startup firm founded by an Indian-born entrepreneur that seeks venture funding. An 
Indian-born (U.S.-based) partner may have soft information that allows him or her to better evaluate the 
ability and personality of this entrepreneur (Stein, 2002; Petersen & Rajan, 2002; Petersen, 2004; Berger 
et al., 2005; Cohen et al., 2008). Moreover, the partner may be a member of the same ethnic-based 
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network as the entrepreneur. Such a network can provide the partner with additional soft information and 
trust and reputation to his/her relationship with the entrepreneur (Greif, 1989, 1993; Landa 1994; Glaeser 
et al. 2000; Casella & Rauch 2002; Fisman 2003). The partner and entrepreneur may also have more 
productive board meetings after the investment is made. This could improve the likelihood the firm will 
realize a successful exit, given that the board of a venture-backed firm engages in both monitoring and 
value-add support. If these benefits were important in practice, then we would expect to observe co-ethnic 
investments to be prevalent and associated with superior performance.  
On the other hand, investments with a co-ethnic may instead be associated with worse outcomes. 
The Indian-born partner may also be overconfident in his/her ability to evaluate and monitor Indian-born 
entrepreneurs, thereby matching with startups of inferior quality. Moreover, the partner may feel social 
pressure from the ethnic-based network to support entrepreneurs from the ethnic network. Rather than 
improving the VC’s monitoring ability, boards with co-ethnic members may hold meetings that are too 
undemanding and/or impose too few control mechanisms on the entrepreneur. Moreover, unfounded trust 
could result in less intensive due diligence of the entrepreneurial company. 
An alternative mechanism that predicts bad outcomes is groupthink (Janis, 1982), which is more 
likely to hold the more similar are the members of a group.1 While the evidence on groupthink in the 
social psychology literature is mixed (eg., Tetlock et al. 1992; Esser, 1998), the possibility that 
entrepreneurial actions might go unchallenged as a result of personal similarity with the VC may dampen 
ultimate outcomes. From a resource perspective, redundant ties (as would apply in co-ethnic networks) 
are less likely to yield diverse, valuable information (Granovetter, 1973), which can also hinder economic 
outcomes. While Granovetter considers the context of the job market, the idea is that “weak” ties (or 
looser, more diverse networks) are more likely to contain varied and non-redundant information, with 
beneficial ultimate effects (thus, the strength of weak ties). For example, Huang, Jin & Qian (forthcoming) 
                                                            
1 Tetlock (1979: 1314) defines groupthink: “Groupthink occurs when independent critical analysis of the problem 
facing the group assumes second place to group members’ motivation to maintain group solidarity and to avoid 
creating disunity by expressing unpopular doubts or opinions.” 
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find that entry by ethnically Chinese firms (from Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan) into China is no 
more successful with regard to profitability than non-ethnically Chinese firms. 
Our analysis suggests that matches based on a shared ethnicity are associated with less successful 
company outcomes. We document a negative correlation between ”Same Ethnicity” and the chance of 
Initial Public Offering or Merger/Acquisition.2 This result suggests that partners of VC firms either 
overestimate the benefits of ethnicity when they select portfolio companies or fail to impose a sufficient 
level of monitoring after the investment is made. An important caveat for this part of our analysis is that 
we equate the investment outcome with the startups’ exit mode due to data limitations. This outcome 
variable is a coarse measure of how VC investments create or destroy value, though it is one that is 
common in the entrepreneurial finance literature.  
To summarize our findings, we show that co-ethnicity is a strong rationale for how VC firms 
match with entrepreneurial companies. A shared ethnicity increases the likelihood of a match occurring, 
and strengthens the VC firm’s involvement conditional on a match. However, this rationale for matching 
is associated with worse investment outcomes. These empirical patterns are qualitatively similar to those 
documented by Gompers et al. (2012), who study matches between VC firms formed in investment 
syndicates. Like us, they find that co-ethnicity (which they label matching based on “affinity-based 
characteristics”) increases the likelihood of a match but decreases the chance of a successful company 
outcome. Combined, our findings and those of Gompers et al. (2012) suggests that participants in the 
venture capital market should be careful when forming matches based on a shared ethnicity. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the data. Section 3 first 
presents results on matching, and then discusses and distinguishes between competing explanations for 
our results. Section 4 is a brief concluding discussion. 
                                                            
2 In a related paper, Hegde and Tomlinson (2011) confirm our finding that shared ethnicity predicts matching in the 
VC industry, but find a positive association with company outcome. This discrepancy can be attributed to critical 
differences in sample design and empirical methodology. Unlike our paper, Hegde and Tomlinson (i) include both 
U.S. and foreign VC firms/startups, (ii) code more ethnic groups, including “broad” ones (e.g., Anglo-Saxon/British), 
(iii) combine founders and individuals who are hired on later, and (iv) restrict their sample to investments where the 
VC firm took a board seat. 
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2. Data 
Sample Design. We collect our data from VentureEconomics, which is one of the largest and most 
complete databases on VC investments.3 We restrict our attention to U.S. VC investments in order to 
eliminate the influence of any institutional differences that exists across countries. We use the part of the 
VentureEconomics data that includes information on the name of the individuals who are involved in VC 
investments. The database collects this name information from web pages, news reports, press releases 
and proprietary surveys. For each startup (where information is available), we first identify the name of 
all company founders. As reported in Panel A of Table 1, our final sample includes 5,093 unique 
individuals who have founded 3,125 unique startups. Untabulated analyses show that our sample is a 
broad cross-section of startup locations, industries, and company ages and development stages at the time 
of financing.  
We then obtain information about all the VCs that invested in each startup in our sample. Our 
dataset covers 2,361 unique individuals working as partners in 966 unique VC firms. Importantly, we 
include both VC firms that took a board seat and VC firms that did not. Our final sample includes 9,079 
unique company-VC firm pairs. Each pair is formed by collapsing information on all (listed) company 
founders and all (listed) active partners at the VC firm.  
The inclusion of VC firms with and without a board seat allows us to study not only how an 
ethnic match relates to the VC firm’s investment in the company, but also how it relates to the decision to 
give the VC firm a board seat, conditional on an investment. This significantly broadens the scope of our 
study, but, it introduces an empirical challenge: we cannot directly measure the ethnicity of partners in 
VC firms that did not take a board seat. VentureEconomics and similar databases do not list the names of 
the partners who were active at a given point in time in a given VC firm. We approximate the list of 
active partners by identifying all individual partners in the VC firm, who took a board seat in any sample 
company that the VC firm financed during the same time period that it financed the focal company. 
                                                            
3 Kaplan et al. (2002) report that the investment coverage of VentureEconomics is about 85%. The fact that many 
companies in VentureEconomics report no VC board seats, however, suggests that this part of the data has lower 
coverage. As reported by Kaplan & Stromberg (2003), VCs almost always have some representation at the board of 
directors. 
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To illustrate our methodology, suppose VC Alpha in 2005 invested both in Company Beta and 
Company Gamma. VC Alpha took a board seat in Company Beta but not in Company Gamma. Suppose 
Company Gamma has a Chinese founder. From our data on board seats, we can directly observe the 
ethnicity of the partner(s) at VC Alpha who took a board seat at Company Beta. Suppose one such partner 
was Chinese. Since the VC firm’s two investments were made in the same year, we classify the 
investment by VC Alpha in Company Gamma as a same-ethnic (Chinese-Chinese) match.  
Our methodology relies on the assumption that all of the VC firm’s active partners were, at least 
to some degree, involved in each investment. Our conversations with partners at VC firms confirm that 
this assumption describes the real-world VC investment process.4 In a statistical sense, if the assumption 
were wrong we may derive biased results on the importance of ethnicity. However, the likely bias is such 
that we would be less likely to find significant results because we would estimate the influence of ethnic 
ties that do not exist in practice. To see this, suppose in the above example that the Chinese partner at VC 
Alpha had no involvement in the investment in Company Gamma. If ethnicity were important then we 
would not identify it for the VC Alpha-Company Gamma pair. As we outline in Section 3, even in the 
presence of such possible bias, we find strong and pervasive empirical patterns consistent with the 
importance of ethnic ties. We also run our tests using only the subsample for which we observe that the 
VC firm took a board seat in the company. Results are qualitatively very similar for the full sample and 
this subsample, suggesting that our assumption is a valid one. 
 
Ethnicity. We use each individual’s surname to determine his or her ethnicity. Our information on ethnic 
surnames comes from two sources. First, we use the database constructed by Kerr (2008), which lists the 
100 most common surnames for Chinese, Indian, Japanese, Korean, Russian, Hispanic, and Vietnamese.5 
                                                            
4 A typical VC firm assigns one or a few partners to each investment, who become formally responsible for 
screening, contract negotiations, monitoring, operational support, etc. All major decisions pertaining to whether, 
when and how to invest are approved at a partner-wide meeting at the VC firm. 
5 In an earlier version of this paper we coded the ethnicity of founders and partners using both Kerr’s database and 
biographical information (available for a smaller sample). We found that the there was a very large overlap between 
these coding methods, confirming that the use of name data captures most individuals from the focal ethnic groups. 
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Secondly, we use a list from Wikipedia on the most common Jewish surnames.6 We limit our attention to 
these eight ethnicities because (i) they represent important subgroups that are active in the U.S VC 
industry, and (ii) the large overlap in surnames makes it difficult identify other ethnicities (e.g., many 
common Norwegian surnames are also common Danish surnames).  
We create the variable “Same Ethnicity”, which is the focus of our study, by comparing the 
ethnicity of any of the company’s founders to that of any of the VC firm’s partners. The variable takes the 
value 1 if there was an ethnic match based on the eight ethnic groups we have coded (i.e., Chinese-
Chinese), and 0 if either there was no ethnic match (i.e., Chinese-Indian) or if none of the individuals 
were from the coded ethnic groups (i.e., Other-Other). For pairs where there are multiple founders and/or 
multiple partners, it is possible that there is more than one ethnic tie. As reported in Panel B of table 1, 
about 5% of all pairs involve an ethnic match. 
 
Summary Statistics. We collect a variety of company, VC and round characteristics for our sample of 
company-VC firm pairs. Panel B of table 1 reports summary statistics of the focal variables. We note that 
60% of all investments in our sample involve the VC firm taking at least one board seat. We use “VC IPO 
Experience” as our main proxy for the reputation/skill of the VC firm. This control variable captures the 
fraction of the VC firm’s all historical portfolio companies that had a successful IPO exit. The variable is 
continuously updated so that it accurately reflects the VC firm’s reputation/skill at the time of its first 
investment in the company. In untabulated robustness tests, we replace it with other proxies for the VC 
firm’s reputation/skill, such as VC firm age and number of historical companies. Results remain 
unchanged. 
We use two measures of company maturity at the time of the VC firm’s first investment in the 
company: “Company Age First Time VC Invested in Company (years)” and “VC Invested in First Round 
of Company (1=Yes, 0=No).” The average company age was 3 years and 44% of investments included a 
first round investment.  
                                                            
6 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Jewish_surnames 
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We use two measures of the VC firm’s investment scope: “Number of Rounds VC Invested in 
Company” and “Total Dollar Amount VC Invested in Company (in $m).” The average number of rounds 
was 2.2 and the average investment amount, which is a summation over all rounds in which the VC firm 
invested, was $9.1 million.  
We use two variables that measure the degree of company-friendliness of the financial contract: 
“Pre-Money Valuation (in $m)” and “Downside Protection Index (Bengtsson and Sensoy, 2011)”. Each 
variable is calculated as the across-round average for each VC firm-company pair. The first variable is 
pre-money valuation, which determines how large equity stake the VC firm received in exchange for its 
investment. The average pre-money valuation was $58 million, but it is only reported for about half of our 
observations. Because this variable is self-reported by companies and VC firms, the selection bias is 
likely such that this subsample include the more valuable companies from our full sample.  
The second variable, Downside Protection Index, determines how much downside protection the 
VC received beyond what is implied by its equity stake. A high Downside Protection Index reflects a less 
company-friendly financial contract. Bengtsson and Sensoy (2011) present a detailed discussion of the 
meaning and importance of each of the six key cash flow contingencies that form the basis for the 
Downside Protection Index variable. This variable, which is collected from mandatory “Certificate of 
Incorporation” legal filings, is only reported for about a quarter of our sample. Bengtsson and Sensoy 
(2011) analyze how this sample is selected and conclude that it is representative with regard to company 
characteristics, except that it is reported more often for companies that raise greater amounts of VC 
financing. 
Finally, we use two measures that capture a successful outcome for the company: “IPO Exit 
(1=Yes, 0=No)” and “IPO or M&A Exit (1=Yes, 0=No).” We limit the sample to investments made prior 
to 2003 to ensure that all sample companies have sufficient time to realize their exit.7 16% of investments 
resulted in an IPO and 58% in a Merger and Acquisition (M&A). These statistics are somewhat higher 
than reported in other studies, reflecting the fact that both founders and partners are more likely to report 
                                                            
7 Our data was collected in 2009, so this cutoff translates into a 7 year time period of realizing an exit.  
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their involvement in a successful venture-backed company. This selective reporting is likely to bias our 
results against finding results on ethnic ties, because companies with higher ex-ante probability of success 
likely have access to a broader group of VC firms, including those without an ethnic match. Put 
differently, ethnic ties plausibly should matter more for firms with low ex-ante probability of success, 
which are less prevalent in our data, because ethnic ties can alleviate the greater informational frictions 
surrounding such firms (Akerlof, 1970). 
 
3. Empirical Results 
Initial Evidence. If ethnic ties were important for how matches are formed in the VC industry, we would 
expect to observe that they occur with an unusually high frequency. Table 2 presents results consistent 
with this expectation. In the first column, labeled “VC firms where (at least) one partner has ethnicity”, 
we report the frequency of pairs with (at least) one ethnic partner. As for the most common ethnicities, we 
note that about 20% VC firms have a Jewish partner, 14% an Indian, and 6% Chinese. In the second 
column, labeled “Companies where (at least) one founder has ethnicity”, we report the frequency of pairs 
with (at least) one ethnic founder. We note that about 8% have a Jewish founder, 9% an Indian, and 6% a 
Chinese. These statistics show that ethnic founders play an important role in the U.S. entrepreneurship 
landscape, a finding that has been highlighted by (Wadhwa, et al. 2007). However, ethnic partners appear 
to play an even more important role. 
We then compute conditional statistics of the founder’s ethnicity based on the partner’s ethnicity. 
Column three labeled “Companies where (at least) one founder has ethnicity if VC firm has (at least) one 
partner with ethnicity” reports the frequency of companies for which a founder shares the same ethnicity 
as the investing VC firm. This variable is identical to our focal variable “Same Ethnicity” that we use in 
our regression analysis, except it reports statistics separately for each ethnic group whereas “Same 
Ethnicity” aggregates this data across all ethnicities. 
Comparing across the third column and the fourth column, labeled “Companies where (at least) 
one founder has ethnicity if VC firm does not have (at least) one partner with ethnicity”, reveals that the 
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conditional probabilities of an ethnic founder are overall higher if the partner shares the same ethnicity. 
Column five reports the results of a Wilcoxon test, and we find that the difference between columns four 
and five is significant for the three most common ethnicities: Jewish, Indian and Chinese. This is evidence 
consistent with the argument that ethnic ties matters for VC investments.  
 
Empirical Strategy. We next conduct a more careful empirical testing of the importance of ethnic ties. 
Our tests proceed in two steps. First, we analyze how the existence of an ethnic tie relates to the 
likelihood that a company and a VC firm form a match (i.e., the extensive margin of the investment 
decision). Second, we analyze how the existence of an ethnic tie relates to the nature of the VC firm-
company match, conditional on one having taken place (i.e., the intensive margin). We here analyze 
whether the VC firm took a board seat, the timing of its first investment, the scope of its overall 
investment, and the design of the financial contract.  
To study each of the above phenomena, we run a series of regressions where the dependent 
variable captures the focal dimension of the VC firm’s investment and the key independent variable is 
“Same Ethnicity”. In our baseline specifications, we include fixed effects of the year of the VC firm’s first 
investment in the company, company location (50 US state dummies) and industry (10 dummies based on 
VentureEconomics 10-segment classification). These controls are included to capture other company 
characteristics that may correlate with an ethnic tie. We also include “VC IPO Experience” to capture 
differences in VC firm investment behavior that are related to reputation/skill rather than ethnicity. For 
OLS regressions, we cluster residuals by both company and VC firm (Petersen, 2009). For other 
regression types, we cluster residuals by firm. In untabulated regressions we instead cluster by firm. 
Results remain unchanged. 
In addition to our baseline specifications, we run OLS fixed effect regressions that include 
company fixed effects. These specifications allow us to rule out the influence of any company-specific 
factors that may correlate with ethnic ties. Moreover, they shed direct light on whether a VC firm with an 
ethnic match invests differently than other VC firms investing in the same company. This within-
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company comparison is arguably more interesting than the baseline specification, because a company 
cannot change the ethnic composition of its team of founders. We also run OLS fixed effect regressions 
that include VC firm fixed effects. These specifications rule out the influence of any VC-specific factors 
that may correlate with ethnic ties. We can also use this within-VC firm comparison to study whether the 
VC firm invests differently in companies where an ethnic tie is present than it does in other companies. 
On the whole, we find qualitatively similar results in the baseline specifications without fixed effects, the 
specifications with company fixed effects, and specifications with company fixed effects.  
One may argue that the many dimensions of the VC firm’s investment in a company are highly 
correlated with whether the VC firm took a board seat, which in turn may be related to an ethnic tie (we 
empirically validate this latter relationship). We account for the influence of board seats. In our 
regressions using the full sample we include “VC Board Seat (1=Yes, 0=No)” as a control variable. We 
also, in a separate set of regressions, restrict our sample to a subset of VC firm-company pairs for which 
the VC firm took a board seat. We find qualitatively similar results for the full sample and the board seat 
subsample. 
 
Results on Matching  
Matching. Table 3 presents regression results on how ethnic ties matter for the likelihood that the 
company and the VC firm form a match. To run these tests, we need to contrast the prevalence of ethnic 
ties for the matches that were actually formed to those for matches that could have been formed but were 
not. Thus, we need to identify counterfactual matches for each of the 9,079 actual pairs in our sample. We 
use data from VentureEconomics to find such counterfactual matches. Specifications 1 through 4 present 
results where the counterfactual sample includes all investments made by another VC in the same month 
and (10-segment) industry. Specification 5 through 8 present results where the counterfactual sample 
includes all investments made by another VC in the same month, (10-segment) industry, and US state. 
We note that the coefficient on “Same Ethnicity” is positive and significant in all specifications, 
confirming that ethnic ties matters for which matches are formed in the US VC industry. 
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Board Seats. Table 4 reports results on tests on how ethnic ties matter for whether the VC firm took a 
board seat, conditional on it making an investment. Again, we find the coefficient on “Same Ethnicity” to 
be positive and significant in all specifications. Because the result holds even when we include company 
fixed effects (specification 3), it cannot be explained by some companies being overall more likely to 
report the composition of their board. Similarly, because the result holds even when we include VC firm 
fixed effects (specification 4), the result cannot be explained by some VC firms being more likely to take 
board seats in all of their investments. Rather, the result shows that VC firms become more involved in a 
portfolio company if they have an ethnic tie with its founders. An unreported comparison of means shows 
that the difference for VC involvement is economically significant: a VC firm with an ethnic tie has a 74% 
likelihood of taking a board, versus 58% for other VC firms. 
 
Timing of Investment. Table 5 reports results on ethnic ties and the VC firm’s timing of its investment. In 
Panel A, the dependent variable is “ln (1 + Company Age First Time VC Invested in Company).” We find 
that in the presence of an ethnic tie, the VC firm invests in younger companies. In Panel B, we find 
similar results using the dependent variable “VC Invested in First Round of Company (1=Yes, 0=No).” 
An unreported comparison of means shows that the difference for VC timing is also economically 
significant. With an ethnic tie, a VC firm has a 54% likelihood of investing in the first round, versus 44% 
for other VC firms. 
 
Scope of VC Investment. Table 6 reports results on ethnic ties and the scope of the VC firm’s investment. 
The dependent variable is “ln (1 + Number of Rounds VC Invested in Company)” in Panel A, and “ln (1 + 
Total Dollar Amount VC Invested in Company)” in Panel B. We find positive (and significant in most 
specifications) coefficients on “Same Ethnicity”, confirming the argument that investments with an ethnic 
tie last over more rounds and involve larger dollar amounts. An unreported comparison of means shows 
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that the average VC firm with an ethnic tie invests $12 million across 2.2 rounds, versus $8.9 million 
across 2.2 rounds. 
 
Financial Contract. Table 7 reports results on how ethnic ties relate to the financial contract used in the 
investment. In Panel A, the dependent variable is “ln (1 + Pre-Money Valuation)”. We find that the VC 
firm paid lower pre-money valuations when its partner(s) had an ethnic tie with the company’s founder(s). 
In other words, for a given dollar investment amount the VC received a smaller equity stake in the 
presence of an ethnic tie. An unreported comparison of means shows a VC firm with an ethnic tie pays an 
average pre-money valuation of $70 million, versus $58 million for other VC firms. 
In Panel B, the dependent variable is “Downside Protection Index (Bengtsson and Sensoy, 2011).” 
We find that contracts are more entrepreneur-friendly for investments with an ethnic tie. These results are 
not significant when we include company fixed effects (specifications 3 and 7), which is not surprising 
given the weak statistical power of such tests.8 An unreported comparison of means shows that the mean 
Downside Protection Index is about one third of a standard deviation lower (4.27 versus 4.73) when the 
VC firms has an ethnic tie. 
 
Summary of Results on Matching. Our empirical tests present strong evidence that ethnic ties matter in the 
U.S. VC industry. We find that the existence of an ethnic tie increases the likelihood that the company 
and the VC firm form a match (i.e., the extensive margin of the investment decision) and makes the VC 
firm invest earlier, more and using more favorable to the entrepreneur pricing/terms (i.e., the extensive 
margin). Because these results hold in specifications with company fixed effects, we infer that the 
influence of shared ethnicity cannot be explained by an omitted company characteristic control, but rather 
reflects the behavior of the focal VC firm as compared to other VC firms investing in the same company. 
                                                            
8 We calculate the dependent variables for each company-VC firm pair by calculating the average pre-money 
valuation and Downside Protection Index, respectively, over all the rounds in which the VC invested. With company 
fixed effects, the only source of variation comes from the fact that different VC firms invested in different rounds. 
However, this variation is low because the pre-money valuations and contract terms are serially correlated across 
rounds. Amplifying this problem is the fact that data on these variables are often not reported for our sample.  
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Similarly, because the results hold in specifications with VC firm fixed effects, we infer that omitted VC 
characteristics are not the explanation. The results reflect the behavior of the focal VC firm in its 
investments with an ethnic tie as compared to its investments without such ties. 
We next turn to discussing the possible rationales for ethnic matching, and then present our tests 
of which rationales are most consistent with the data.  
 
Rationales for Matching 
Discussion. Before we begin analyzing the empirical association between ethnic matching and investment 
outcomes, it is important to note that matching in the VC context has two distinct goals. First, the partner 
and founder seek to increase the likelihood that the startup will turn into a successful company, ideally 
that can be exited through an Initial Public Offering (IPO). Success is the ultimate prize for both parties: 
The partner is able to exit the investment, receives monetary payoffs (from carried interest), and 
strengthens his or her standing in the VC community. The founder also receives payoffs, and may enjoy 
private benefits from the successful outcome itself or from being subsequently “self-employed” in a 
successful company. 
A second goal of matching is that the partner and the founder want to minimize the transaction 
costs surrounding the formation and maintenance of their relationship. For the partner, these transaction 
costs include expenses incurred during due diligence, legal fees for contract negotiation, expenses for 
travelling to board meetings, etc. Another transaction cost, and arguably the most important one in 
practice, is the partner’s opportunity cost of time. The VC firm must carefully economize on how much 
time the partner spends on each investment, because otherwise it risks forgoing other promising 
investments and provide inadequate monitoring/support to other portfolio companies. For the founder, the 
opportunity cost of time is also very valuable. If the founder spends too much time dealing with a given 
VC firm, then he or she may ignore other investors and not put in sufficient efforts on growing the 
company. 
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 Matching based on shared partner and founder ethnicity would create value in a VC investment if 
it were to achieve either or both of the goals discussed above. Value creation could occur due to easier 
communication, more efficient sharing of soft information or more trust among members of the same 
ethnic subgroup. We label such rationales for matching as “good”.  
Conversely, a match based on shared ethnicity would destroy value if the likelihood of a 
successful outcome decreased and/or transaction costs pertaining to relationship were to increase. An 
obvious question to ask is why a partner and a founder would chose to form a co-ethnic match if it would 
result in value destruction. One possibility is that they have a behavioral bias that makes them 
overestimate the skills and capabilities of people who share their ethnicity. Alternatively, they may 
overestimate the benefits of forming a match with such people. Another possibility, which we discussed 
in detail in Section 1, is that a too high degree of similarity between founders and partners may result in 
group-think during board meetings. Finally, founders and partners may respond to pressure from their 
ethnic subgroup to do business with members of the same subgroup. We label such rationales as “bad”, 
since matching based on them does not create value. 
 
Empirical Strategy and its Limitations. We analyze data on investment outcomes to test whether co-ethnic 
matches in the VC industry are formed based on “good” (i.e., value-increasing) or “bad” (i.e., value-
destroying) rationales. We define an investment as successful if the company had an IPO, and then 
correlates this investment outcome with our focal independent variable “Same Ethnicity”. In our 
robustness tests, we also define an investment as successful if the company was acquired or merged with 
another company. In addition to “Same Ethnicity”, we include controls for investment year, industry and 
location (i.e., state dummies). We also include as controls the variables we studied in previous tables: 
company age at VC’s first investment, whether the VC invested in the first round, number of rounds in 
which the VC invested, dollar amount the VC invested in the company, and pre-money valuation.9 As 
                                                            
9 We exclude “Downside Protection Index (Bengtsson and Sensoy, 2011)” because this variable is only reported for 
a small subset of our sample, creating problems with statistical power and representativeness. 
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such, we study whether the VC firm realized a more/less successful company outcome conditional on the 
intensity of its investment. In some tests we also control for two other variables, “log Distance between 
Company and VC (miles)” and “Patents 5 years after first VC round (1=Yes, 0=No)”, that may be 
correlated with company outcomes 
Although our analysis of outcomes allows us to shed some light on the rationale behind ethnic 
matching, it has four limitations. The first limitation is that we can only study investment outcomes for 
investments in our sample made prior to 2003. Our data is collected at 2009, so this cutoff ensures that 
each successful company had sufficient time to realize its exit. The surviving sample includes 4,812 
observations, of which 2,499 are matches where the VC firm takes a board seat. 
The second limitation is that our tests cannot speak to the association between ethnic matching 
and transaction costs, such as the VC firm’s selection and monitoring efforts. Despite their real-world 
importance, these costs are not observable features of the VC investment. Therefore, it remains possible 
that ethnic matching could be formed based on the “good” rationale of lower transaction costs even if 
such investments were associated with worse investment outcomes.  
 The third limitation is that the measure of a successful investment outcome is incomplete and 
noisy in that attaining an initial public offering is only one coarse measure of entrepreneurial performance. 
The private nature of the companies and investors that we study imply a lack of detailed data on 
investment outcomes (e.g., IRR or dollar payoff from each investment). An additional challenge is that 
we are unable to perfectly control for other determinants of an IPO, such as the quality of the founder’s 
idea or the nature of the startup’s other assets. This follows from the fact that we cannot include company 
fixed effects in the outcome regressions, because our measure of investment outcome is identical for all 
VC firms investing in the company. 
 The fourth, and arguably most problematic, limitation is that our tests confound selection and 
treatment effects. Although this problem plagues most existing studies of the VC industry (see Sorensen, 
2007, for a discussion), it is particularly severe in our context because selection and treatment have 
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opposite effects on investment outcomes. Consider a simple theoretical framework where the “good” 
rationales for ethnic matching dominate the “bad” rationales, and where the VC firm wishes to maximize 
the ex-post quality of its portfolio. Accordingly, the VC firm would base its investment choices on the ex-
ante quality of available startups and the value creation specific to each matching. In equilibrium, the VC 
firm would select some co-ethnic investments in lower quality startups over other investments in higher 
quality startups. Because of such offsetting selection effects, it is difficult to empirically isolate the 
treatment effect (i.e, value-creation) associated with ethnic matching. 
 
Results on Investment Outcomes. 
Table 8 presents our results on the association between co-ethnic ties and company outcomes. The 
estimation technique is OLS with residuals clustered on both VC firm and company, except in 
specifications 3 and 6 where VC firm fixed effects are included. All results are qualitatively similar in 
unreported tests where the estimation technique is logit, and residuals clustered on VC firm. 
In Panel A, the dependent variable is “Company IPO Exit (1=Yes, 0=No)”. This variable is 1 if 
the company had a successful IPO exit, and is 0 otherwise. We find that an IPO outcome is less common 
when the VC firm has a co-ethnic tie with the company. This result holds in specifications with different 
controls, including those with VC firm fixed effects, and also for the subsample of investments where the 
VC firm took a board seat. We obtain qualitatively similar coefficient estimates in Panel B, where the 
dependent variable is “Company IPO or M&A Exit (1=Yes, 0=No)”. This variable is 1 if the company 
either had a successful IPO or M&A exit, and is 0 otherwise. However, the results are only statistically 
significant in specifications with the subsample where the VC firm took a board seat. We conclude from 
these results that co-ethnic ties appear to be associated with worse investment outcomes. Similar results 
are obtained by Gompers et al. (2012) who study company outcomes for co-ethnic matches between VC 
firms in investment syndicates. Combined, these findings point to ethnic matching hampering company 
performance and, as a result, investor returns. 
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4. Concluding Discussion 
This paper aims to fill a gap in the literature regarding the process by which entrepreneurial startups get 
matched with VC firms. We investigate the empirical relevance of personal similarity in the U.S. VC 
market, focusing on ethnicity. Our results show that person-based matching based on a shared ethnicity is 
a strong predictor of a range of VC investment behavior.  
 It is useful to situate the results reported here within the context of the literatures on VC and new 
venture team formation. While we are not able to identify the exact mechanism driving the matching 
process between VC investors and entrepreneurs, we can relate the plausible mechanisms in our context 
to those found in the associated literature examining the reasons for VC syndication (e.g., Lerner, 1994; 
Brander, et al., 2002) and the consequences of varied VC syndicates (Hochberg et al., 2007). A starting 
point is the observation that financial constraints are not likely to be the primary driver of VC syndication 
since the magnitude of VC investments, especially in early stage rounds, are a small fraction of the typical 
VC fund size. Studies examining the impetus for investment syndication broadly analyze selection-based 
and value creation-based reasons (other theories do exist, but we highlight these theories since they are 
most germane to our discussion). 
 In selection-based accounts, VC syndication takes place to facilitate due diligence and assessment 
processes under the logic that different investors have different opinions and/or expertise with regard to 
identifying the most promising venture opportunities and entrepreneurs. An information mechanism 
therefore underlies the selection-based argument in that investor teams are assembled to maximize the 
chance of selecting the most promising startups in which to invest. Extending team composition from the 
strictly within-investor realm into the investor-entrepreneur formation realm, we find support for the 
information transmission mechanism in that ethnic ties may be pipes along which information can be 
shared with the result of dampened information asymmetry. The form of the information transmitted 
could be direct exchange among the parties, norms of trust within a social network, and/or a governance 
mechanism enabled by shared social networks. In this governance mechanism, defecting behavior will be 
more costly within a social network because it is likely to be broadcast more quickly and completely 
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within than across social networks. We are unable to distinguish which of these effects may be operating 
in this context. 
 The information and value-added rationale for team formation are not mutually exclusive, however, 
as researchers in the VC literature acknowledge (Brander et al., 2002; Hsu, 2004; Sorenson, 2007; 
Chemmanur et al., 2011). Our results are consistent with this view, as we find that co-ethnicity 
significantly explains the likelihood of a VC-entrepreneur match. 
 While our primary aim is in examining the VC-entrepreneur matching context, an area we believe 
is both important and understudied, it is possible to speculate about how general the co-ethnicity effects 
are likely to be. We have chosen a context in which there is constrained matching: a given VC partner can 
only sit on a certain number of boards at a given time, and a given entrepreneurial company can only have 
a certain number of VC partners on its board. Like other matching contexts in which there is a zero-sum 
choice involved in that matching with one entity means foregoing other opportunities (e.g., the marriage, 
job, and college markets), assessing the role of personal similarity in explaining matching seems fairly 
generic. 
 Our empirical setting of the VC-entrepreneur matching context also involves a different production 
process distinct from other settings in which social networks play a role, such as common school ties 
between mutual fund managers and portfolio company managers (Cohen et al., 2008). The VC-
entrepreneur context has the potential to involve both selection and value-added, and it is the latter 
process in particular which highlights the role of co-production and makes VC-entrepreneur matching a 
double-sided selection process. These features distinguish our empirical setting from other investment 
contexts such as mutual fund portfolio selection. 
 We end with a few thoughts for future avenues of research given the results reported here. First, 
examining the possible effects more comprehensively would be interesting. For example, how does 
personal similarity (including co-ethnicity) affect entrepreneur-VC interaction during the pre-investment 
due diligence process and the post-investment board involvement, and with what consequences? Second, 
what are the welfare and efficiency implications of matching in the market for entrepreneurial finance? 
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Given the average characteristics of venture partners in the sample, coupled with the role of personal 
similarity between entrepreneurial founder and venture partner in explaining match likelihood, issues of 
efficiency naturally arise. Our aim in this paper was to better understand matching in the market for 
entrepreneurial finance; we hope that future work will extend this research by delving into these and other 
questions of the implications of this matching process. 
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Table 1 - Sample Overview
Panel A: Sample Overview
VC Partner - Company Founder Matches 10081
Unique Company Founders 5093
Unique Companies 3125
Unique VC Partners 2361
Unique VCs 966
VC-Company Matches 9079
Panel B: Summary Statistics of Key Variables (Sample is VC-Company Matches)
Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Same Ethnicity 9079 5.2% 22.2%
VC IPO Experience 9079 15.1% 10.9%
VC Board Seat (1=Yes, 0=No) 9079 59% 49.2%
Company Age First Time VC Invested in Company (years) 8827 2.9 3.4
VC Invested in First Round of Company (1=Yes, 0=No) 9079 44.2% 49.7%
Number of Rounds VC Invested in Company 9079 2.2 2.2
Total Dollar Amount VC Invested in Company (in $m) 9079 9.1 14.0
Pre-Money Valuation (in $m) 4815 58.1 97.0
Downside Protection Index (Bengtsson and Sensoy, 2011) 1923 4.7 1.5
IPO Exit (1=Yes, 0=No) 4934 16.7% 37.3%
IPO or M&A Exit (1=Yes, 0=No) 4934 57.3% 49.5%
Panel C: Summary Statistics of Additional Controls (Sample is VC-Company Matches)
Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Distance between Company and VC (miles) 8804 812.8 1015.2
Patents 5 years after first VC round (1=Yes, 0=No) 9079 47.7%
We obtain from VentureEconomics 10,081 listed actual matches between a VC partner and a company
founder. We aggregate these individual-based matches to VC and company levels, and create our sample of
9,079 "VC-Company Matches". This sample includes both matches where the VC invested and took a board
seat and matches where the VC invested but did not take a board seat. We identify the partner's ethnicity
from any investment made by the VC firm concurrently with an investment in the focal company. Panel B
reports statistics for key variables and Panel C for variables used as additional controls. VC IPO
Experience is the historical fraction of the firm's portfolio companies that have had an IPO exit. Downside
Protection Index and Pre-Money Valuation reflect average for all rounds in which VC invested (and data is
available).Data on Downside Protection Index come from VCExperts. The sample for company exits is
restricted to investment made prior to 2003, to ensure sufficient time for company to realize exit (our data
is collected to 2009).
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Table 2 - Ethicities
I II III IV
VC firms where (at 
least) one partner has 
ethnicity
Companies where (at 
least) one founder has 
ethnicity
Companies where (at 
least) one founder has 
ethnicity if VC firm has 
(at least) one partner 
with ethnicity
Companies where (at 
least) one founder has 
ethnicity if VC firm 
does not have (at least) 
one partner with 
ethnicity
Jewish 19.7% 8.2% 9.6% 7.9%
Indian 14.2% 9.2% 15.2% 8.2%
Chinese 5.5% 5.0% 9.8% 5.0%
Korean 3.5% 1.4% 1.3% 1.4%
Hispanic 3.9% 1.6% 2.0% 1.5%
Russian 1.7% 1.6% 1.3% 1.6%
Japanese 0.9% 0.5% 0.0% 0.5%
Vietnamese 0.3% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9%
Significance for 
Wilcoxon test of 
whether III is different 
from IV
This table reports the ethnicity for the VC partner, company founder, and company founder by whether the partner and founder ethnicities were
the same or different. We aggregate individual-based matches to VC and company levels, so one observation is a unique match of a VC and a
company. Sample size is 9079. Difference between the subsamples is reported and significance tested with a Wilcoxon test. *** marks
significance at 1%, and ** significance at 5%.
**
***
***
V
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Table 3 - VC Investment Decision
Dependent Variable:
Specification 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Same Ethnicity 0.257*** 0.012*** 0.016*** 0.012*** 0.202*** 0.020** 0.023*** 0.019***
[0.046] [0.005] [0.003] [0.002] [0.048] [0.009] [0.006] [0.006]
VC IPO Experience 0.189** 0.008** 0.007 -0.01 -0.002 0.006
[0.086] [0.004] [0.007] [0.101] [0.011] [0.018]
Sample
Criteria Counteractual Match
Observations 192423 192423 192423 192423 64671 64671 64671 64671
R-squared 0.07 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.15 0.15 0.01 0.11
Regression Type Logit OLS OLS OLS Logit OLS OLS OLS
F.E. VC Year Investment Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F.E. Company Industry Yes Yes N.A. Yes Yes Yes N.A. Yes
F.E. Company State Yes Yes N.A. Yes Yes Yes N.A. Yes
F.E. Company No No Yes No No No Yes No
F.E. VC No No No Yes No No No Yes
Sample is actual and counterfactual VC-Company matches. OLS regressions where the dependent variable is 1 if the
VC invested in the company (i.e., an "Actual Match") and is 0 if the VC invested in another company in same industry
(10-segment) and month (i.e., a "Counterfactual Match"). In specifications 5-8 we also include the criteria that the VC
invested in another company in the same state. Specifications 1 and 5 are logit regressions with residuals clustered by
company (we obtain similar results if we cluster by VC). VC IPO Experience is the historical fraction of the firm's
portfolio companies that have had an IPO exit. Specifications 2 and 6 are OLS regressions with residuals clustered by
both VC and company (Petersen, 2009). Specifications 3 and 7 are fixed effect OLS with company fixed effects.
Specifications 4 and 8 are fixed effect OLS with VC fixed effects. F.E. VC Year Investment are dummies for the year the 
VC first invested in the company. F.E. Company Industry are 10-segment VentureEconomics dummies. F.E. Company
State are dummies for the U.S. of the company's headquarter. *** marks significance at 1%, and ** significance at
5%
Actual and Counterfactual VC-Company 
Matches
Same month, industry (10-segment 
VentureEconomics) and state
Actual and Counterfactual VC-Company 
Matches
Same month and industry (10-segment 
VentureEconomics) 
VC Invested in Company (1=Yes, 0=No)
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Table 4 - VC Board Seat
Dependent Variable:
Specification 1 2 3 4
Same Ethnicity 0.724*** 0.154*** 0.193*** 0.111***
[0.109] [0.022] [0.032] [0.024]
VC IPO Experience -0.568** -0.132 -0.126*
[0.223] [0.109] [0.069]
Sample
Observations 9079 9079 9079 9079
R-squared 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.05
Regression Type Logit OLS OLS OLS
F.E. VC Year Investment Yes Yes Yes Yes
F.E. Company Industry Yes Yes N.A. Yes
F.E. Company State Yes Yes N.A. Yes
F.E. Company No No Yes No
F.E. VC No No No Yes
Actual VC-Company Matches
VC Board Seat (1=Yes, 0=No)
Sample is actual VC-Company matches. The dependent variable is 1 if the VC invested and took a board seat,
and is 0 if the VC invested but did not take a board seat. VC IPO Experience is the historical fraction of the
firm's portfolio companies that have had an IPO exit. Specification 1 is a logit regression with residuals
clustered by company (we obtain similar results if we cluster by VC). Specification 2 is an OLS regression with
residuals clustered by both VC and company (Petersen, 2009). Specification 3 is a fixed effect OLS with
company fixed effects. Specification 4 is a fixed effect OLS with VC fixed effects. F.E. VC Year Investment are
dummies for the year the VC first invested in the company. F.E. Company Industry are 10-segment
VentureEconomics dummies. F.E. Company State are dummies for the U.S. of the company's headquarter. ***
marks significance at 1%, and ** significance at 5%.
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Table 5 - VC Timing of Investment
PANEL A: Company Age
Dependent Variable:
Specification 1 2 3 4 5 6
Same Ethnicity -0.139*** -0.044*** -0.097*** -0.157*** -0.047*** -0.131***
[0.041] [0.013] [0.033] [0.045] [0.017] [0.041]
VC IPO Experience 0.419*** 0.057** 0.275* -0.077*
[0.122] [0.028] [0.156] [0.044]
VC Board Seat (1=Yes, 0=No) -0.126*** -0.044*** -0.111***
[0.018] [0.005] [0.015]
Sample
Observations 8827 8827 8827 5197 5197 5197
R-squared 0.15 0.84 0.12 0.15 0.85 0.12
Regression Type OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
F.E. VC Year Investment Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F.E. Company Industry Yes N.A. Yes Yes N.A. Yes
F.E. Company State Yes N.A. Yes Yes N.A. Yes
F.E. Company No Yes No No Yes No
F.E. VC No No Yes No No Yes
Sample is actual VC-Company matches. In Panel A, the dependent variable is the logarithm of the company's
age at the time of the VC's investment. Specifications 1-3 include the full sample of actual VC-company
matches, and specifications 4-6 includes only actual VC-company matches where the VC took a board seat. VC
IPO Experience is the historical fraction of the firm's portfolio companies that have had an IPO exit.
Specifications 1 and 4 are OLS regressions with residuals clustered by both VC and company (Petersen, 2009).
Specification 2 and 5 are fixed effect OLS with company fixed effects. Specifications 3 and 6 are fixed effect
OLS with VC fixed effects. F.E. VC Year Investment are dummies for the year the VC first invested in the
company. F.E. Company Industry are 10-segment VentureEconomics dummies. F.E. Company State are
dummies for the U.S. of the company's headquarter. *** marks significance at 1%, and ** significance at 5%..
Actual VC-Company Matches Actual VC-Company Matches with 
Board Seat
ln (1 + Company Age First Time VC Invested in Company)
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Table 5 - continued
PANEL B: Investment in First Round
Dependent Variable:
Specification 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Same Ethnicity 0.360*** 0.082*** 0.076*** 0.050** 0.369*** 0.086*** 0.05 0.064**
[0.100] [0.029] [0.023] [0.024] [0.114] [0.033] [0.033] [0.029]
VC IPO Experience -2.136*** -0.467*** -0.229*** -1.181*** -0.273*** -0.1
[0.249] [0.076] [0.049] [0.297] [0.090] [0.085]
VC Board Seat (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.885*** 0.200*** 0.071*** 0.177***
[0.047] [0.012] [0.009] [0.011]
Sample
Observations 9079 9079 9079 9079 5357 5357 5357 5357
R-squared 0.08 0.10 0.39 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.43 0.06
Regression Type Logit OLS OLS OLS Logit OLS OLS OLS
F.E. VC Year Investment Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F.E. Company Industry Yes Yes N.A. Yes Yes Yes N.A. Yes
F.E. Company State Yes Yes N.A. Yes Yes Yes N.A. Yes
F.E. Company No No Yes No No No Yes No
F.E. VC No No No Yes No No No Yes
Actual VC-Company Matches
VC Invested in First Round of Company (1=Yes, 0=No)
Actual VC-Company Matches with Board 
Seat
Sample is actual VC-Company matches. In Panel B, the dependent variable is 1 if the VC invested in the company's
first VC financing round, and if the VC invested only in later rounds. Specifications 1-4 include the full sample of
actual VC-company matches, and specifications 5-8 include only actual VC-company matches where the VC took a
board seat. VC IPO Experience is the historical fraction of the firm's portfolio companies that have had an IPO exit.
Specifications 1 and 5 are logit regressions with residuals clustered by company (we obtain similar results if we
cluster by VC). Specifications 2 and 6 are OLS regressions with residuals clustered by both VC and company
(Petersen, 2009). Specification 3 and 7 are fixed effect OLS with company fixed effects. Specifications 4 and 8 are
fixed effect OLS with VC fixed effects. F.E. VC Year Investment are dummies for the year the VC first invested in the
company. F.E. Company Industry are 10-segment VentureEconomics dummies. F.E. Company State are dummies for
the U.S. of the company's headquarter. *** marks significance at 1%, and ** significance at 5%..
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Table 6 - Scope of VC Investment
Panel A: Number of Rounds
Dependent Variable:
Specification 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Same Ethnicity 0.082*** 0.080** 0.087*** 0.109*** 0.083*** 0.082** 0.013 0.098***
[0.026] [0.031] [0.026] [0.030] [0.030] [0.035] [0.029] [0.034]
VC IPO Experience -1.330*** -1.208*** -0.487*** -0.877*** -0.814*** -0.149**
[0.082] [0.120] [0.056] [0.101] [0.113] [0.073]
VC Board Seat (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.105*** 0.099*** 0.169*** 0.107***
[0.014] [0.019] [0.011] [0.014]
Sample
Observations 9079 9079 9079 9079 5357 5357 5357 5357
R-squared 0.23 0.47 0.19 0.23 0.64 0.22
Regression Type Neg. Bin. OLS OLS OLS Neg. Bin. OLS OLS OLS
F.E. VC Year Investment Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F.E. Company Industry Yes Yes N.A. Yes Yes Yes N.A. Yes
F.E. Company State Yes Yes N.A. Yes Yes Yes N.A. Yes
F.E. Company No No Yes No No No Yes No
F.E. VC No No No Yes No No No Yes
Sample is actual VC-Company matches. In Panel A, the dependent variable is the logarithm of the number of rounds
the VC invested in the company. Specifications 1-4 include the full sample of actual VC-company matches, and
specifications 5-8 includes only actual VC-company matches where the VC took a board seat. VC IPO Experience is
the historical fraction of the firm's portfolio companies that have had an IPO exit. Specifications 1 and 5 are negative
binominal regressions with residuals clustered by company (we obtain similar results if we cluster by VC).
Specifications 2 and 6 are OLS regressions with residuals clustered by both VC and company (Petersen, 2009).
Specification 3 and 7 are fixed effect OLS with company fixed effects. Specifications 4 and 8 are fixed effect OLS with
VC fixed effects. F.E. VC Year Investment are dummies for the year the VC first invested in the company. F.E.
Company Industry are 10-segment VentureEconomics dummies. F.E. Company State are dummies for the U.S. of the
company's headquarter. *** marks significance at 1%, ** significance at 5%, and * significance at 10%.
ln (1 + Number of Rounds VC Invested in Company)
Actual VC-Company Matches Actual VC-Company Matches with Board 
Seat
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Table 6 - continued
Panel B: Dollar Amount
Dependent Variable:
Specification 1 2 3 4 5 6
Same Ethnicity 0.225*** 0.091* 0.162*** 0.191*** 0.003 0.112**
[0.047] [0.050] [0.044] [0.053] [0.058] [0.047]
VC IPO Experience 1.117*** 0.617*** 1.539*** 1.150***
[0.206] [0.107] [0.232] [0.150]
VC Board Seat (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.311*** 0.357*** 0.261***
[0.032] [0.020] [0.020]
Sample
Observations 9024 9024 9024 5319 5319 5319
R-squared 0.11 0.14 0.11 0.14 0.18 0.13
F.E. VC Year Investment Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F.E. Company Industry Yes N.A. Yes Yes N.A. Yes
F.E. Company State Yes N.A. Yes Yes N.A. Yes
F.E. Company No Yes No No Yes No
F.E. VC No No Yes No No Yes
Actual VC-Company Matches Actual VC-Company Matches with 
Board Seat
ln (1 + Total Dollar Amount VC Invested in Company)
Sample is actual VC-Company matches. In Panel B, the dependent variable is the logarithm of the total
dollar amount VC invested in company. Specifications 1-3 include the full sample of actual VC-company
matches, and specifications 4-6 includes only actual VC-company matches where the VC took a board seat.
VC IPO Experience is the historical fraction of the firm's portfolio companies that have had an IPO exit.
Specifications 1 and 4 are OLS regressions with residuals clustered by both VC and company (Petersen,
2009). Specification 2 and 5 are fixed effect OLS with company fixed effects. Specifications 3 and 6 are fixed
effect OLS with VC fixed effects. F.E. VC Year Investment are dummies for the year the VC first invested in
the company. F.E. Company Industry are 10-segment VentureEconomics dummies. F.E. Company State are
dummies for the U.S. of the company's headquarter. *** marks significance at 1%, ** significance at 5%,
and * significance at 10%
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Table 7 - Financial Contract
Panel A: Pricing
Dependent Variable:
Specification 1 2 3 4 5 6
Same Ethnicity 0.115* 0.011 0.107 0.204*** -0.003 0.203**
[0.068] [0.033] [0.073] [0.076] [0.041] [0.091]
VC IPO Experience 1.874*** 0.159** 1.782*** 0.200*
[0.186] [0.070] [0.271] [0.112]
VC Board Seat (1=Yes, 0=No) -0.329*** -0.032** -0.302***
[0.034] [0.013] [0.033]
Sample
Observations 4812 4812 4812 2499 2499 2499
R-squared 0.19 0.16 0.14 0.15 0.2 0.13
F.E. VC Year Investment Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F.E. Company Industry Yes N.A. Yes Yes N.A. Yes
F.E. Company State Yes N.A. Yes Yes N.A. Yes
F.E. Company No Yes No No Yes No
F.E. VC No No Yes No No Yes
Sample is actual VC-Company matches. In Panel A, the dependent variable is the logarithm of the pre-
money valuation of the company. The dependent variable is the average across all rounds in which VC
invested in company (where data is available). Specifications 1-3 include the full sample of actual VC-
company matches, and specifications 4-6 includes only actual VC-company matches where the VC took a
board seat. VC IPO Experience is the historical fraction of the firm's portfolio companies that have had an
IPO exit. Specifications 1 and 4 are OLS regressions with residuals clustered by both VC and company
(Petersen, 2009). Specification 2 and 5 are fixed effect OLS with company fixed effects. Specifications 3 and
6 are fixed effect OLS with VC fixed effects. F.E. VC Year Investment are dummies for the year the VC first
invested in the company. F.E. Company Industry are 10-segment VentureEconomics dummies. F.E.
Company State are dummies for the U.S. of the company's headquarter. *** marks significance at 1%, **
significance at 5%, and * significance at 10%.
Actual VC-Company Matches
ln (1 + Pre-Money Valuation)
Actual VC-Company Matches with 
Board Seat
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Table 7 - continued
Panel B: Contracting
Dependent Variable:
Specification 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Same Ethnicity -0.102*** -0.466*** 0.006 -0.390** -0.128*** -0.584*** -0.025 -0.317
[0.039] [0.171] [0.027] [0.172] [0.041] [0.173] [0.024] [0.195]
VC IPO Experience -0.387*** -1.825*** 0.047 -0.371*** -1.749*** 0.169**
[0.088] [0.440] [0.065] [0.112] [0.561] [0.069]
VC Board Seat (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.016 0.076 0.022** 0.125
[0.015] [0.071] [0.011] [0.084]
Sample
Observations 1923 1923 1923 1923 1289 1289 1289 1289
R-squared 0.17 0.01 0.1 0.17 0.02 0.1
Regression Type Neg. Bin. OLS OLS OLS Neg. Bin. OLS OLS OLS
F.E. VC Year Investment Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F.E. Company Industry Yes Yes N.A. Yes Yes Yes N.A. Yes
F.E. Company State Yes Yes N.A. Yes Yes Yes N.A. Yes
F.E. Company No No Yes No No No Yes No
F.E. VC No No No Yes No No No Yes
Sample is actual VC-Company matches. In Panel B, the dependent variable is the number of downside protection
contingent cash flow rights (see Bengtsson and Sensoy, 2011, for details). A higher (lower) value of the index reflects a
contract that is more (less) favorable to the VC and less (more) to the entrepreneur. The dependent variable is the
average across all rounds in which VC invested in company (where data is available). Specifications 1-4 include the
full sample of actual VC-company matches, and specifications 5-8 includes only actual VC-company matches where the
VC took a board seat. VC IPO Experience is the historical fraction of the firm's portfolio companies that have had an
IPO exit. Specifications 1 and 5 are negative binominal regressions with residuals clustered by company (we obtain
similar results if we cluster by VC). Specifications 2 and 6 are OLS regressions with residuals clustered by both VC
and company (Petersen, 2009). Specification 3 and 7 are fixed effect OLS with company fixed effects. Specifications 4
and 8 are fixed effect OLS with VC fixed effects. F.E. VC Year Investment are dummies for the year the VC first
invested in the company. F.E. Company Industry are 10-segment VentureEconomics dummies. F.E. Company State are
dummies for the U.S. of the company's headquarter. *** marks significance at 1%, ** significance at 5%, and *
significance at 10%
Downside Protection Index (Bengtsson and Sensoy, 2011)
Actual VC-Company Matches with Board 
Seat
Actual VC-Company Matches
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Table 8 - Company Exit
Panel A: IPO Exit
Dependent Variable:
Specification 1 2 3 4 5 6
Same Ethnicity -0.051* -0.064** -0.061** -0.085** -0.091*** -0.070*
[0.029] [0.028] [0.031] [0.035] [0.035] [0.039]
VC IPO Experience 0.551*** 0.575*** 0.557*** 0.567***
[0.068] [0.070] [0.081] [0.084]
VC Board Seat (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.022* 0.019 0.005
[0.012] [0.013] [0.014]
Sample
Observations 3652 3569 3569 1802 1776 1776
R-squared 0.23 0.24 0.19 0.26 0.27 0.22
F.E. VC Year Investment Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F.E. Company Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F.E. Company State Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Distance and Patents No Yes No No Yes No
F.E. VC No No Yes No No Yes
Sample is actual VC-Company matches. OLS regressions. In Panel A, the dependent variable is 1 if the
company had an IPO exit, and is 0 otherwise. In Panel B, the dependent variable is 1 if the company had an
IPO or M&A exit, and is 0 otherwise. In all specifications, the sample excludes investments after 2003 (our
data is collected to 2009). Specifications 1-3 include the full sample of actual VC-company matches, and
specifications 4-6 includes only actual VC-company matches where the VC took a board seat. VC IPO
Experience is the historical fraction of the firm's portfolio companies that have had an IPO exit.
Specifications 1, 2, 4 and 5 are OLS regressions with residuals clustered by both VC and company
(Petersen, 2009). Specifications 3 and 6 are fixed effect OLS with VC fixed effects. Additional controls are
company age at VC's first investment, whether VC invested in first round, number of rounds in which VC
invested, dollar amount VC invested in company, and pre-money valuation. Specifications 2 and 5 also
include distance company-VC as control and whether the company had any patents 5 years after the first
VC round. F.E. VC Year Investment are dummies for the year the VC first invested in the company. F.E.
Company Industry are 10-segment VentureEconomics dummies. F.E. Company State are dummies for the
U.S. of the company's headquarter. *** marks significance at 1%, ** significance at 5%, and * significance
at 10%
Company IPO Exit (1=Yes, 0=No)
Actual VC-Company Matches Actual VC-Company Matches with 
Board Seat
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Table 8 - continued
Panel B: M&A Exit
Dependent Variable:
Specification 1 2 3 4 5 6
Same Ethnicity -0.008 -0.025 -0.022 -0.084** -0.093** -0.107**
[0.038] [0.038] [0.038] [0.039] [0.039] [0.049]
VC IPO Experience 0.238*** 0.276*** 0.315*** 0.327***
[0.083] [0.084] [0.111] [0.112]
VC Board Seat (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.032** 0.029* 0.003
[0.015] [0.015] [0.018]
Sample
Observations 3652 3569 3569 1802 1776 1776
R-squared 0.19 0.2 0.16 0.23 0.23 0.2
F.E. VC Year Investment Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F.E. Company Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F.E. Company State Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Distance and Patents No Yes No No Yes No
F.E. VC No No Yes No No Yes
Company IPO or M&A Exit (1=Yes, 0=No)
Actual VC-Company Matches Actual VC-Company Matches with 
Board Seat
38
LUND UNIVERSITY 
SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT
Working paper 2013:8
The Knut Wicksell Centre for Financial Studies
Printed by Media-Tryck, Lund, Sweden 2013
OLA BENGTSSON | DAVID H. HSU
We document that ethnicity is a major determinant of how founders of U.S. startup companies match with 
partners of U.S. VC firms. A shared ethnicity increases the likelihood that a VC firm invests in a startup, 
strengthens the degree of the VC firm’s involvement, increases the size and scope of the investment, and 
makes the financial contract more entrepreneur-friendly. These findings are robust to specifications with VC
firm or startup company fixed effects. Based on our finding that a shared ethnicity is associated with worse 
investment outcomes (IPO or M&A), we infer that a VC partner may overestimate the benefits of investing 
in a founder from the same ethnic group. Our paper adds new evidence on the role of ethnic minorities 
in entrepreneurship, and contributes to prior studies of how VC firms overcome informational frictions.
THE KNUT WICKSELL CENTRE FOR FINANCIAL STUDIES
The Knut Wicksell Centre for Financial Studies conducts cutting-edge research in  financial economics and 
related academic disciplines. Established in 2011, the Centre is a collaboration between Lund University 
School of Economics and Management and the Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) in Stockholm. 
The Centre supports research projects, arranges seminars, and organizes conferences. A key goal of the 
Centre is to foster interaction between academics, practitioners and students to better understand current 
topics  related to financial markets. Working papers 
Editor: F. Lundtofte
The Knut Wicksell Centre for Financial Studies
Lund University 
School of Economics and Management
Ethnic Matching in the U.S. Venture 
Capital Market
OLA BENGTSSON AND DAVID H. HSU
KNUT WICKSELL WORKING PAPER 2013:7                            
Ethnic Matching in the U.S. Venture Capital Market
LUND UNIVERSITY 
SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT
Working paper 2013:8
The Knut Wicksell Centre for Financial Studies
Printed by Media-Tryck, Lund, Sweden 2013
OLA BENGTSSON | DAVID H. HSU
We document that ethnicity is a major determinant of how founders of U.S. startup companies match with 
partners of U.S. VC firms. A shared ethnicity increases the likelihood that a VC firm invests in a startup, 
strengthens the degree of the VC firm’s involvement, increases the size and scope of the investment, and 
makes the financial contract more entrepreneur-friendly. These findings are robust to specifications with VC
firm or startup company fixed effects. Based on our finding that a shared ethnicity is associated with worse 
investment outcomes (IPO or M&A), we infer that a VC partner may overestimate the benefits of investing 
in a founder from the same ethnic group. Our paper adds new evidence on the role of ethnic minorities 
in entrepreneurship, and contributes to prior studies of how VC firms overcome informational frictions.
THE KNUT WICKSELL CENTRE FOR FINANCIAL STUDIES
The Knut Wicksell Centre for Financial Studies conducts cutting-edge research in  financial economics and 
related academic disciplines. Established in 2011, the Centre is a collaboration between Lund University 
School of Economics and Management and the Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) in Stockholm. 
The Centre supports research projects, arranges seminars, and organizes conferences. A key goal of the 
Centre is to foster interaction between academics, practitioners and students to better understand current 
topics  related to financial markets. Working papers 
Editor: F. Lundtofte
The Knut Wicksell Centre for Financial Studies
Lund University 
School of Economics and Management
Ethnic Matching in the U.S. Venture 
Capital Market
OLA BENGTSSON AND DAVID H. HSU
KNUT WICKSELL WORKING PAPER 2013:7                            
Ethnic Matching in the U.S. Venture Capital Market
Key Words: Entrepreneurship, Venture Capital, Matching, Ethnicity
JEL codes: G24, L26
